Thursday, January 31, 2013

Market Incentives


The rules of the game in Kenya entrench distrust and a reputation of any goes. 

Attempts by Nongovernmental organizations and government to build social capital by way of trade associations, solidarity networks, and groups (micro-credit requires group membership) have failed because the legal enforcement mechanisms are still lacking, and the success of these groups is dependent on adequate information about creditworthiness that so far can only be captured by unreliable informal channels. 

The incentive for opportunism is too high even within groups because the sanctions are few; being socially ostracized in a place where few records exist and people don’t set up permanent roots in urban areas is not as traumatizing. As Thomas Hobbes warned in Leviathan, the absence of an enforcer implies a free-for-all: everybody knows that everybody else can behave in an opportunistic fashion, therefore everybody behaves opportunistically.

Data collection is not determined within the country. It is very often determined by outside donors who provide specific funding for a particular project, which they use to prove their policies outside the country. Therefore since data is not collected for the state itself, the data doesn't foster debate on policy quality or whether the government is meeting its plans including millennium goals or Vision 2030. 

Creating public records could create trust by creating a system that is accountable. For example, both government and Nongovernmental organizations could establish local units that hire local people to man them. Data collection could be regularly done on all basic factors like health, age, school attendance, security enforcement, income generating activities and the data should be made available locally in whatever manner is palatable to the locals. The devolved government would rely on such data to budget and plan, and the business and civil community can use the same information to add value.

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